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AN ESSAY IN SEPARATION OF POWERS: SOME EARLY
VERSIONS AND PRACTICES
GERHARD CASPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The separation of governmental powers along functional lines
has been a core concept of American constitutional law ever since
the Revolution. Barren assertions of its importance, however, do
not capture the complexity of the matter when viewed from the
vantage point of either theory or practice. This essay will be con-
cerned with the question of what happened to separation of powers
notions as the framers' generation and the government during
Washington's presidency faced practical problems of governmental
organization and the conduct of government. The relevant litera-
ture is voluminous and many of the issues are well known. The
essay will not rediscuss the details of the constitutional distribu-
tion of powers or the system of checks and balances. Nor will it,
with the exception of the debate about the removal power, con-
sider controversies that are quite familiar. Instead, the emphasis
will be on somewhat more obscure aspects of the problem that may
illuminate some of the complexities inherent in the generality of
the doctrine.
Following a review of the state of the separation of powers doc-
trine during the period of constitution-making, the essay will focus
on some issues of interbranch communications and the establish-
ment of the "great departments" of government. It will then ex-
amine in detail the manner in which the Washington administra-
tion and Congress handled the problem of the American hostages
in Algiers, keeping in mind that the federal government was essen-
tially created to conduct foreign, trade, and defense policies.
Although the relation between legislative and executive powers
has, once again, become a matter of dispute, the point of this exer-
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cise is not to draw specific lessons from history even as to the de-
tailed reconstruction of the legal side of the Algiers epi-
sode-however striking its parallels to contemporary events and
difficulties. The essay is not an attempt to question modern consti-
tutional law and its interpretations from a historical vantage point.
Instead, it is an essay about the reactions of those individuals who
reflected about separation of powers as they implemented the new
Constitution. "[T]he essay," Felix Frankfurter once said, "is tenta-
tive, reflective, suggestive, contradictory, and incomplete. It mir-
rors the perversities and complexities of life."'
The essay is not, however, without a point of view. It does sug-
gest that the very centrality of the separation of powers doctrine in
the last quarter of the eighteenth century quickly produced a
sharpened sense of its uncertainty as the "first constitutional gen-
eration" encountered specific tasks of governmental organization
and statecraft. Indeed, the doctrine itself mirrored the complexi-
ties of life and its symbolisms. It was "tentative, reflective, sugges-
tive, contradictory, and incomplete."' 2 It did not provide a major
premise for easy syllogisms concerning the organization of govern-
ment. This essay will be concerned mostly with legislative and ex-
ecutive powers in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The
subject of the judiciary will be taken up in a later effort.
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DocTRINE DURING THE PERIOD OF
I CONSTITUTION-MAKING
"A society in which the guarantee of rights is not assured, nor
the separation of powers provided for, has no constitution. '3 This
stringent formulation is that of article 16 of the French Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man of 1789. With respect to the separation
of powers, it expressed what had become an almost sacred article
of faith in the deliberations of the constitutional assemblies of the
United States and France.4 The reference to separation of powers
as a fundamental normative principle5 in bills of rights can also be
1. P. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 203 (1970).
2. Id.
3. J. GODECHOT, LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 35 (1970).
4. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 184 (1967).
5. W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 8 (1965).
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found in American constitutions. Article VI of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights of 1776 thus provided "[tlhat the legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever sep-
arate and distinct from each other."' Similar formulations appear
elsewhere, for instance in the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights. In its
Constitution, Virginia repeated its commitment to the separation
of powers and elaborated: "The legislative, executive, and judiciary
department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise
the powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person
exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same time...
")7
When these words were written, the separation of executive and
judicial, legislative and executive powers had been the subject of
ever increasing attention on both sides of the Atlantic for about
150 years. Nedham, Locke, Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Blackstone,
Rousseau, Siy~s, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison are only some of
the names associated with this debate." Their respective contribu-
tions reflected rather diverse political, constitutional, and theoreti-
cal concerns. It is therefore hardly surprising that, by the last
quarter of the eighteenth century, no single doctrine using the la-
bel of separation of powers had emerged that could command gen-
eral assent.
Invocation of the phrase "separation of powers" in bills of rights,
such as those of Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Virginia, and France, however, suggests a common
linkage between the concept of liberty and the notion of separation
of powers.9 Although the meaning of liberty was not something on
which agreement existed, the functional linkage was emphasized
again and again. Montesquieu, perhaps the most frequently cited
and the most confused and confusing of the writers on separation
of powers, provided the classical formulation concerning the
linkage:
6. 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1687 (1909).
7. 7 Id. at 3815.
8. For some of the sources see the excerpts in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 311-54 (P.
Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
9. See W. GwYN, supra note 5, at 11-27.
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When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be
then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them
in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not sepa-
rated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor.1"
As put forward by Montesquieu, separation of powers is a func-
tional concept; separation is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condi-
tion of liberty. Its absence promotes tyranny.
Unfortunately, many political writers, Montesquieu included,
tended to amalgamate (and thus obscure) separation of powers no-
tions with another possible condition of liberty, or at least of good
government: the institution of "mixed" government, which was
aimed primarily at balancing different classes or interests.11 Since
the days of Aristotle it had become customary to differentiate
among forms of government, especially monarchy, aristocracy, and
what we now refer to as democracy. In his history of Rome, Polyb-
ius, the Greek historian, hypothesized that Rome had avoided the
cycle of change and deterioration occurring in states with a single
form of government. 12 In contrast, Rome combined the three types
of government to create a state of equilibrium through the princi-
ple of counteraction. 13 Although Polybius' analysis of the Roman
constitution was less than convincing, he established the notion of
mixed government 4 that eventually became commonplace, espe-
cially as applied to the British constitution and as advocated by
Montesquieu and John Adams, among others. Adams thought that
Polybius' views were "deservedly revered."'" After a detailed ac-
10. C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 202 (D. Carrithers ed. 1977) (T. Nugent trans.
1st ed. 1750).
11. Cf. W. GWYN, supra note 5, at 26.
12. See POLYBIUS, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 317-18 (I. Scott-Kilvert trans. 1979).
13. Id.
14. See A. PASSERIN D'ENTRkVES, THE NOTION OF THE STATE 115 (1967).
15. 1 J. ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 169 (1787).
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count of those views, however, Adams suggested that Polybius was
wrong in judging that the invention of a more perfect system of
government than the Roman one was impossible:
We may be convinced that the constitution of England, if its
balance is seen to play, in practice, according to the principles of
its theory-that is to say, if the people are fairly and fully repre-
sented, so as to have the power of dividing or choosing, of draw-
ing up hill or down, instead of being disposed of by a few
lords-is a system much more perfect. The constitutions of sev-
eral of the United States, it is hoped, will prove themselves im-
provements both upon the Roman, the Spartan, and the English
commonwealths."l
The debate about the desirability of mixed government thus con-
cerned issues of immediate relevance to the American revolution-
aries: the manifestations of British constitutional arrangements in
the governmental structures of the former colonies and ways to im-
prove them.
Although great differences in the institutional arrangements of
government in the various colonies existed,'17 to say that, by and
large, the colonies had "mixed" government based on the British
model with monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements mani-
fested in their governors, councils, and legislatures is not an exag-
geration. A London compendium from 1755 said of the colonial
governments: "By the governor, representing the King, the colonies
are monarchical; by a Council they are aristocratical; by a house of
representatives, or delegates from the people, they are democrati-
cal .... 18
This summary of mixed government, more an "ideal type" than
a complete description of the constitutional facts, did not mean
that separation of powers notions were absent before 1776. Rather,
they were intertwined with older notions reflecting the allocation
of powers in the mixed colonial regimes.19 In these mixed regimes,
16. Id. at 176.
17. In fact, even the sources of governmental authority varied from one colony to another.
18. W.P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTrrIUONs 257 (1980) (quoting 1 W. DOUGLASS,
A SUMMARY, HISTORICAL AND POLrTICAL, OF THE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS IN NORTH AMERICA
213-15 (1755)).
19. See M. VILE, supra note 4, at 128.
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only the popular house of the legislature represented the people,
the often predominating gubernatorial powers possessed legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial elements, and the functionally differ-
entiated judiciary was kept less than completely separate. Al-
though the colonists and the colonial legislatures were in fact
highly autonomous from London, their constitutional conflicts con-
cerned the separation and mixing of powers that differed sharply
as to the local and distant sources of their respective authority.
The challenge faced after the Declaration of Independence was
how to adapt the institutions of mixed government to the doctrine
of popular sovereignty.20 The issue was no longer the separation of
differently based powers, but the separation of power (in the singu-
lar) flowing from one source: the people. If the separation of pow-
ers .was a necessary condition of liberty, the task was to reconcile it
to the notion of popular sovereignty, which was invoked explicitly
and dramatically in the majority of the new state constitutions and
was the foremost expression of that liberty.
A further problem was that the people in the former colonies
were stratified: there were old inhabitants and newcomers, revolut-
ionaries and loyalists, free men and indentured servants and
slaves. Often, there was a "gentry" as distrustful of the "people" as
the "people" were distrustful of the "gentry." The tensions result-
ing from these stratifications were bound up with the organiza-
tional tasks of the new states.
As one reviews the state constitutions adopted between 1776 and
1787 for the ways in which they implemented separation of powers
notions, one is struck by the fact that the particulars display an
exceedingly weak version of separation of powers. Most of the con-
stitutions made a conceptual distinction, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, between legislative, executive, and judicial functions, in-
troduced more or less elaborate systems of interbranch
ineligibilities, and gave some, although often a modest, measure of
independence to the judiciary. The most distinct feature of the
constitutions, however, was the dependence of the executive on the
legislative branch on four counts. First, only New York, Massachu-
setts, and New Hampshire provided for the election of governors
by voters. In the latter two states, the choice reverted to the legis-
20. W.P. ADAMS, supra note 18, at 259-62.
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lature if no candidate received a majority of the votes. The other
constitutions granted the legislature the power to elect the gover-
nor or president, typically on an annual basis. In Pennsylvania the
legislature and the "supreme executive council," which was popu-
larly elected, jointly chose the president. Second, only Massachu-
setts and New York recognized an overridable veto.2' In New York
the veto power was lodged in a council of revision. Third, all states
provided for some kind of executive or privy council, generally
elected by the legislature.22 Fourth, states distributed the power of
appointments in various ways, but legislative controls
predominated.
Furthermore, although governors were authorized to exercise,
subject to council participation, "the executive powers of govern-
ment,"23 this authorization occasionally was restricted by the
clause that it had to be _done according to the laws of the state. 4
Virginia even added the proviso that the governor "shall not,
under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of
any law, statute or custom of England. '25
The 1776 state constitutional arrangements met with some im-
mediate criticism on separation of powers grounds. In 1777, New
York provided for more separation, and the 1778 draft constitution
of Massachusetts was rejected, partially because it was viewed as
insufficiently mindful of the separation of powers. The towns of
Essex County, in the so-called Essex Result of 1778, submitted a
detailed critique that not only deplored the lack of "proper" execu-
tive authority, but also disapproved of the intermingling of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers. 6
The Essex Result complicated the debate over separation of
powers considerably by invoking the notion of checks and bal-
ances. "A little attention to the subject will convince us, that these
21. The first South Carolina Constitution, which was short-lived, vested the "legislative
power" in a president, an assembly, and a legislative council, and thus provided the presi-
dent with an absolute veto.
22. The New York institutional arrangements were more complex.
23. 7 F. THORPE, supra note 6, at 3816.
24. See id. ("according to the laws of this Commonwealth").
25. Id. at 3816-17. For a discussion of these and related restrictions and practices, see C.
THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 29-34 (1969).
26. THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 324-25 (0. Handlin & M. Handlin
eds. 1966).
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three powers ought to be in different hands, and independent of
one another, and so ballanced, and each having that check upon
the other, that their independence shall be preserved."2 The in-
sight that checks and balances were needed to maintain the inde-
pendence of each of the three branches revived the concept of bal-
anced government without quite capturing the complexity of the
matter. The problem had primarily become that of separation of
power flowing from a single source, rather than the balancing of
various factions in the organization of the government. In its newly
added Bill of Rights, the 1780 Constitution of Massachusetts ad-
dressed the principle explicitly in language that also can be found
in the earlier state constitutions: "All power residing originally in
the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates
and officers of government, vested with authority, whether legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are
at all times accountable to them."2
In the end, the 1780 Constitution was not dramatically different
from the 1778 draft as to the manner in which it distributed pow-
ers, although the later document did provide for the (overridable)
gubernatorial veto. Its main balancing feature could be found in
the 1778 draft: the annual election of the governor directly by the
voters (provided a candidate received a majority of votes). The
separate gubernatorial election was, of course, in accord with John
Adams's strong belief in an executive "distinct and independent of
the legislative."2 9
The Bill of Rights of the 1784 New Hampshire Constitution ex-
pressed clearly that the doctrine of separation of powers, or for
that matter the notion of checks and balances, could not supply
neat formulas from which proper governmental organizational ar-
rangements would follow automatically. Article XXXVII of the
New Hampshire Bill of Rights displayed a deeper appreciation of
the problem than the more barren assertions in all the other state
constitutions:
In the government of this state, the three essential powers
thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive and judicial, ought to be
27. Id. at 337.
28. 3 F. THORPE, supra note 6, at 1890.
29. 3 J. ADAMS, supra note 15, at 419.
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kept as separate from and independent of each other, as the na-
ture of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with
that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the con-
stitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.30
This provision, which is still in force, obviously views the separa-
tion of powers as essential to free government. However, it also
reflects the concept of separate and independent powers as limited
by the very notion of free government and by the necessity of
maintaining "the whole fabric of the constitution."3' 1 In short, New
Hampshire emphasizes separation, coordination, and cooperation.
Its dialectical view of the matter concisely summarizes the difficul-
ties that awaited the federal constitutional convention as it faced
the separation of powers "doctrine."
The Articles of Confederation had established a congress of state
delegates as the central law-making and governing institution. Al-
though its President, committees, and civil officers32 partook of an
executive quality, and although after 1780 it established a court of
appeals for cases of capture,33 the Confederation can hardly be
seen as possessing the characteristics of a tripartite government.
On the other hand, one should not overlook the fact that some in-
stitutional separation of administrative tasks had evolved, dic-
tated, as it were, by the nature of things, and the need to free the
Congress from concerning itself with too much administrative
detail.34
Although the absence of separation of powers was not generally
viewed as the main Weakness of the Confederation, Hamilton criti-
cized the Articles as early as July 1783 for "confounding legislative
and executive powers in a single body" and for lacking a federal
judicature "having cognizance of all matters of general concern. '3 5
In a draft resolution calling for a convention to amend the Articles,
Hamilton wrote that the Confederation's structure was "contrary
30. 4 F. THORPE, supra note 6, at 2457.
31. Id.
32. The "civil officers" were the Postmaster General after 1775, and the Secretary of For-
eign Affairs, the Secretary of War, and the Superintendent of Finance after 1781. In 1784,
however, the latter was to be replaced by a Board of Treasury.
33. H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT 101-34 (1977).
34. See C. THACH, JR., supra note 25, at 73.
35. 3 THE PAPERs OF ALEXANDER HAmILTON 420-21 (H. Syrett ed. 1966).
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to the most approved and well founded maxims of free government
which require that the legislative executive and judicial authorities
should be deposited in distinct and separate hands."36 Hamilton
had intended to submit the resolution to the Continental Congress,
but abandoned the project for want of support. 37
When Randolph opened the substantive deliberations of the
1787 Convention with his enumeration of the defects of the Con-
federation, he apparently made no reference to separation of pow-
ers." The Virginia Plan, submitted the same day, however, implied
separation of powers and called for a quadripartite governmental
structure: a bicameral legislature, a national executive, a national
judiciary (to serve during good behavior), and a council of revision
to be composed of the executive and members of the judiciary. The
first house of the legislature was to elect the second from a pool of
candidates to be nominated by the states, and the legislature was
to elect the executive and judiciary. The executive was to enjoy
"the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation,"
but what these rights were was not adumbrated. 9
Other plans for a constitution all presupposed a three-branch
structure of government.40 A resolution "that a national govern-
ment ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislative,
judiciary, and executive" was adopted overwhelmingly in the Com-
mittee of the Whole on May 30, the day following submission of
the Virginia Plan.4' In a way, this event was the beginning and the
end of the consideration of separation of powers as such in the
Convention. To be sure, in the subsequent discussions of the struc-
ture and powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
as well as in the repeated debates concerning a council of revision,
the delegates raised many points about the independence of the
respective branches, the dangers of encroachments, and the need
for checks and balances. What was strikingly absent, however, was
anything that might be viewed as a coherent and generally shared
view of separation of powers.
36. Id. at 421.
37. Id. at 420 n.1.
38. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
39. Id. at 20-21.
40. See 3 id. at 595-630.
41. 1 id. at 30-31.
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The constitutional text itself, although implying the notion of
distinct branches, did not invoke the separation of powers as a
principle. Some of the state ratifying conventions attempted to
remedy this omission in their original proposals for bills of rights
to be added to the Constitution. Madison also sought a remedy. In
1788, in the Federalist papers, Madison had considered it neces-
sary to defend the Constitution against the charge that it paid no
regard to the separation of powers. His core argument in The Fed-
eralist No. 47 was the "impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding
any mixture"42 as demonstrated by the state constitutions and as
supported by the "oracle who is always consulted and cited on this
subject.., the celebrated Montesquieu. ' ' 43 Montesquieu, according
to Madison, did not mean to suggest that the three departments
"ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of
each other."
'4
"
Madison's 1789 proposal for a new article VII to precede the ex-
isting one (which was to be renumbered) was ingenious in the man-
ner in which it formulated a separation of powers doctrine that
took account of the constitutional scheme of checks and balances:
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to
the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so
that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers
vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the
powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exer-
cise the powers vested in the legislative or executive
departments.45
The separation of powers provision of Roger Sherman's draft bill
of rights, also dating from the summer of 1789, captured even more
clearly the point made by Madison's proposed article VII:
The legislative, executive and judiciary powers vested by the
Constitution in the respective branches of the Government of
the United States shall be exercised according to the distribu-
tion therein made, so that neither of said branches shall assume
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 339 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
43. Id. at 337.
44. Id. at 338.
45. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1979).
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or exercise any of the powers peculiar to either of the other
branches.46
The House adopted Madison's amendment (with a minor
change) despite objections that it was unnecessary and "subversive
of the Constitution. '47 Madison supposed "the people would be
gratified with the amendment, as it was admitted that the powers
ought to be separate and distinct; it might also tend to an explana-
tion of some doubts that might arise respecting the construction of
the Constitution. '4 This was an intriguing suggestion: the amend-
ment would provide a principle of interpretation for the Constitu-
tion-in dubio, pro separation of powers. In fact, Madison had
taken this position earlier that year when discussing the removal
power.49 Alas, the Senate rejected the amendment for reasons we
shall never know.5 0 One can only surmise that the Senate was not
eager to adopt separation of powers as an independent doctrine or
even as a mere principle of construction for the many and subtle
"mixing" decisions of the framers, some of which benefitted the
Senate.
With regard to these "mixing" decisions, on such crucial touch-
stones as the mode of selecting the President and the assignment
of the appointments power, the Convention delegates could not
agree on constitutional solutions until the very end of the delibera-
tions. Only the presidential veto (with the two-thirds override)
stood more or less firm from the very beginning of the Conven-
tion,51 although for most of its duration it was thought to be vested
in a President who would be elected by the legislature.2 Proposals
for an absolute veto were defeated twice, albeit a three-fourths
override was agreed upon on August 15, until reconsideration of
the matter on September 12.
46. 46 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION BULLETIN 350-52 (1987).
47. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
48. Id. at 760.
49. See 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 172-74.
50. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1150 (1971).
51. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 38, at 106.
52. Id. at 81.
53. 2 id. at 301.
54. Id. at 586-87.
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As to the mode of selecting the President, election by the legisla-
ture was more or less supported firmly, until, at the end of August,
the issue became clearly linked to that of state power and influ-
ence. The electoral college compromise worked out by the Commit-
tee on Remaining Matters "almost satisfied almost everybody."55
However, in the context and in light of what went on before, one
should be reluctant to view the compromise as a ringing endorse-
ment of a John Adams-type position on the executive.
The Virginia plan had been silent about the appointments power
with the exception of legislative election of judges. Early on, how-
ever, the appointment of judges was given to the Senate.56 The
matter was discussed repeatedly, although, again, the division of
the power into one of presidential nomination and Senate advice
and consent came only as part of the compromises made by the
Committee on Remaining Matters. The delegates overwhelmingly
agreed to this division of the appointments power on September 7,
after James Wilson had objected in vain to "blending a branch of
the Legislature with the Executive."5 Likewise, a joint ballot of
both houses was to appoint the Treasurer,58 and only on Septem-
ber 14 was this provision struck in the interest of conformity.59
One additional aspect of mixing deserves notice. In defense of
his interpretation of the common defence and general welfare
clause as a separate and substantive grant of power to the Con-
gress, William Crosskey has argued that some of the congressional
powers that appear in section 8 of article I were included there not
to secure them as against the states but to prevent their passing to
the President as executive prerogatives.60 Fortunately, one need
not agree with Crosskey's larger point to conclude that his argu-
ment has merit and has implications for the separation of powers
doctrine. Commercial powers, the naturalization power, and the
power to establish courts, subdue rebellions, make war, raise ar-
55. F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 250 (1985).
56. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 38, at 233.
57. 2 id. at 538-41.
58. Id. at 314-15.
59. Id. at 614.
60. See 3 W. CROSSKEY & W. JEFFREY, JL, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1980).
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mies, or call out the militia were prerogatives that the delegates to
the Convention did not hesitate to turn into legislative powers."1
The Convention debates, taken as a whole, hardly suggest a
strong consensus that the "[s]tate experience . . . contributed,
nothing more strongly, to discredit the whole idea of the sovereign
legislature, to bring home the real meaning of limited government
and coordinate powers. ' 62 Forrest McDonald, in his recent book on
the origins of the Constitution," has concluded from the decisions
of the Convention that the "doctrine of the separation of powers
had clearly been abandoned in the framing of the Constitution." '64
This judgment presupposes that a doctrine existed that could be
abandoned. Given the state of the discussion of the framers in the
last quarter of the eighteenth century and the constitutions en-
acted after 1776, a "pure" doctrine of separation of powers can be
no more than a political science or legal construct. 5
No consensus existed as to the precise institutional arrange-
ments that would satisfy the requirements of the doctrine.6 The
only matter on which agreement existed was what it meant not to
have separation of powers: it meant tyranny. This insight is not to
be belittled. Madison and Sherman were right when, in their 1789
proposals, they claimed that the particular distribution of powers
found in the Constitution could be legitimately seen as a version of
an uncertain doctrine.6 7
III. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
BRANCHES AFTER FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
On April 30, 1789, President Washington took the oath of office
and delivered his inaugural address before the Congress. If Senator
Maclay is to be trusted, the president was exceedingly ill at ease;6"
but so was everybody else. Deciding the proper forms of address,
61. F. McDoNALD, supra note 55, at 262-63.
62. C. THACH, JR., supra note 25, at 52.
63. F. McDONALD, supra note 55.
64. Id. at 258.
65. See M. VILE, supra note 4, at 13 (the "pure doctrine" of separation of powers is an
"ideal type" that has been rarely put into practice).
66. W. GWYN, supra note 5, at 128.
67. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 492-501.
68. E. MACLAY, THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 9 (2d ed. 1927).
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whether titles were appropriate, what ceremonies the new govern-
ment should conduct, and how the separate branches, and-within
Congress-the two houses, should interact was not easy. Symbol-
ism became important.
During the Senate debate that followed, the Vice President re-
ferred to Washington's address as "his most gracious speech."69
This brought Senator Maclay, a kind of republican prig, to his feet:
Mr. President, we have lately had a hard struggle for our liberty
against kingly authority. The minds of men are still heated:
everything related to that species of government is odious to the
people. The words prefixed to the President's speech are the
same that are usually placed before the speech of his Britannic
Majesty. I know they will give offense. I consider them as im-
proper. I therefore move that they be struck out . . .
And struck out they were, eventually, against the protestations of
John Adams who wanted "dignified and respectable govern-
ment. 7 1 Dignified government also lost out when the House and
Senate refused to grant the President a title such as "His Highness
the President of the United States of America and Protector of the
Rights of the Same. '7 2
The importance of symbolism to the interaction between the
branches was clear to many. Washington requested advice on these
matters and wrote to Madison: "As the first of every thing, in our
situation will serve to establish a Precedent, it is devoutly wished
on my part, that these precedents may be fixed on true
principles. '73
From the vantage point of separation of powers, physical inter-
action was an issue of surprising significance. How should messages
be handled, what communications should be oral, which should be
written, what was the proper mode for discussing oral communica-
tions? Some of these matters had been viewed as of such conse-
quence for the separation of powers, that state constitutions had
69. Id. (emphasis omitted).
70. Id. at 9-10. Maclay objected to the manner in which the Chancellor of the State of
New York introduced the President. The Chancellor proclaimed, "'Long live George Wash-
ington, President of the United States!'" 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 26-27.
71. E. MACLAY, supra note 68, at 10.
72. Id. at 25.
73. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 132.
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regulated certain aspects of official intercourse. Article XXXII of
the Georgia Constitution of 1777, for instance, had provided that
all transactions between the legislative and executive bodies be
communicated by message.74 The underlying fear was that the Ex-
ecutive might otherwise exercise undue influence on the delibera-
tions of the legislature. As so often was the case, the reaction was
against the British model of parliamentary government and what
was perceived as ministerial predominance and corruption under
that system. 5
Four examples from the early days of the federal government are
representative and illustrate some of the problems. The first in-
volved the Senate in its "executive" role concerning appointments.
Should advice and consent be given viva voce or by ballot? In June
of 1789, the Senate decided to proceed by ballot in order to pre-
vent "bargaining for" or "purchase of' votes.76 The issue was re-
opened, however, after the Senate had, for the first time, rejected a
presidential nomination in early August. Washington reacted with
a message-one that was for him somewhat acerbic-in which he
suggested that the Senators might have asked him for more infor-
mation concerning the candidate. The President then met with a
Senate committee which proposed that he should communicate
nominations orally, a step that might produce a viva voce vote.
Washington insisted that it was up to the President to decide in
what place and manner he should consult the Senate "as his coun-
cil." Although he did not rule out personal appearance, he was firm
about whose choice it was. The Senate yielded on presidential dis-
cretion and also changed its mind in favor of viva voce vote. Ap-
parently, the President never made a nomination in person.
Similar questions arose with respect to the Senate's role con-
cerning treaties, the second example of the problems of physical
interaction. On the very day on which the previous issue was re-
solved, Washington sent a message to the Senators informing them
that he would meet them in their chamber the following day "to
advise with them on the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with
74. 2 F. THORPE, supra note 6, at 782.
75. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 144 (1969).
76. E. MACLAY, supra note 68, at 76-79.
77. See the account in 1 G. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND
PRACTICE 52-58 (1938).
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the Southern Indians. ' 78 The famous episode is well known and
need not be recounted.7 9 As it turned out, Washington's attempt to
interact personally with the Senators encountered two overwhelm-
ing difficulties. First, Washington's personal and official status
made open and frank discussion not impossible, but very difficult.
Second, even though Washington had brought the Secretary of
War, General Henry Knox, along to answer questions about de-
tails, the treaty problems were simply too complex to be dealt with
orally and without preparation. The Senate postponed the matter
for the weekend and disposed of it on Monday, again with the
President present.80 The experiment was not repeated, however.
Its failure, nevertheless, did not mean that in the future the Presi-
dent was contemptuous of the Senate's role in treaty making. In-
deed, he continued to seek advice, not just approval, but he did so
in writing.8'
The third example, one of the more telling debates concerning
modes of interaction, occurred at the end of June, in the House of
Representatives. The House had before it the bill for establishing
the Treasury Department, which made it the duty of the Secretary
to "digest and report plans for the improvement and management
of the revenue, and the support of the public credit." 2 No similar
clause was contained in the legislation establishing the Foreign Af-
fairs and War Departments. Its presence here reflected the special
constitutional role of the House with respect to bills for raising
revenue:
It is the proper business of this House to originate revenue laws;
but as we want information to act upon, we must procure it
where it is to be had, consequently we must get it out of this
officer, and the best way of doing so, must be by making it his
duty to bring it forward. 3
78. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 65.
79. See 1 G. HAYNES, supra note 77, at 62-68.
80. See E. MACLAY, supra note 68, at 125-30.
81. See 1 G. HAYNES, supra note 77, at 68.
82. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 592.
83. Id. at 607 (statement of Rep. Sherman).
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This view of the matter was also that of the most likely appointee
to the office, Alexander Hamilton, who wanted direct dealings with
Congress and some independence from the President. 4
The clause about "reporting plans" met with strong objections.
John Page of Virginia saw it as a "dangerous innovation upon the
Constitutional privilege" of the House of Representatives. 5 He
worried that members would be inclined to defer to others who
had thoroughly studied a case, thus creating undue influence. "Nor
would the mischief stop here; it would establish a precedent which
might be extended, until we admitted all the ministers of the Gov-
ernment on the floor, to explain and support the plans they have
digested and reported: thus laying a foundation for an aristocracy
or a detestable monarchy." 8 Tucker of South Carolina used sepa-
ration of powers language: "If we authorize him to prepare and re-
port plans, it will create an interference of the Executive with the
Legislative powers .... ,,87 He referred the House to the mode of
interaction specified by the Constitution in section 3 of article
II-it was for the President to provide information and make rec-
ommendations.8 8 Other Congressmen warned against "the doctrine
of having prime and great ministers of State."8' 9 In the end, the
House defeated the motion to strike out the clause and adopted it,
but only after substituting the verb "prepare" for "report." 90
The fourth significant example concerning modes of interaction
occurred in 1792 when a host of substantive and symbolic issues
arose. That year, the House wanted to investigate the destruction
of the United States Army under the command of General St.
Clair at the hand of Indians in the Ohio country in 1791. The first
proposal before the legislators was to request that the President
institute an inquiry. This approach raised separation of powers ob-
jections. Although the reasons were more adumbrated than clearly
stated, apparently the members believed that telling the President
how to carry the laws into execution was an encroachment on exec-
84. F. McDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 128 (1979).
85. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 592 (statement of Rep. Page).
86. Id. at 592-93.
87. Id. at 593 (statement of Rep. Tucker).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 601 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
90. Id. at 607.
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utive power.91 The motion was overwhelmingly defeated and, in-
stead, a motion based on the powers of the House respecting the
expenditures of public money was adopted. This adopted motion
required the appointment of a House committee of inquiry that
would "be empowered to call for such persons, papers, and records,
as may be necessary to assist their inquiries. '' 92 In order not to en-
croach on executive power, then, the House proceeded to authorize
the first parliamentary investigation of the executive branch.
The resolution was adopted on March 27, 1792. The Committee
then proceeded to ask Secretary Knox for papers. Knox referred
the matter to the President, who called together his cabinet. Ac-
cording to Jefferson, they were unanimous as to the power of the
House to investigate. They also believed that requests for execu-
tive papers had to be made directly to the President, and that al-
though the President should cooperate, he should refuse to deliver
papers "the disclosure of which would injure the public."'9 3 The
House accepted both restrictions when, on April 4, it passed a res-
olution "[t]hat the President of the United States be requested to
cause the proper officers to lay before the House such papers of a
public nature, in the Executive Department, as may be necessary
to the investigation of the causes of the failure of the late expedi-
tion under Major General St. Clair.' '9 4 This resolution treated the
executive branch as a unitary "department" and recognized the
potential need of the United States not to make everything
public.95
After the Committee report and public examination of such wit-
nesses as Major General St. Clair and Secretary Knox, a resolution
was introduced to notify the Secretaries of Treasury and War that
the House would consider the report "to the end that they may
attend the House, and furnish such information as may be condu-
cive to the due investigation of the matters stated in the said re-
port."96 Fisher Ames of Massachusetts supported the motion, not-
ing the reputational interests involved. The motion "was due to
91. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490-94 (1792).
92. Id. at 493.
93. THE COMPLETE ANAS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (F. Sawvel ed. 1903).
94. 3 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 91, at 536.
95. No papers, or rather copies of papers, were withheld in this case, however.
96. 3 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 91, at 679.
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justice, to truth, and to the national honor, to take effectual mea-
sures to investigate the business. '97 Ames saw the inquiry as pre-
paratory to an impeachment. The fact that it was not an impeach-
ment was used by opponents who argued that the House had no
right to cite the Secretaries while also urging "the impropriety of
any of the Heads of Departments coming forward, and attempting
in any way to influence the deliberations of the Legislature."9 8 The
latter reason seems to have been the weightier one.
Disputes concerning modes of interaction necessarily acquired
partisan overtones as Congress began to develop parties. Argu-
ments such as the ones just quoted reflected not only constitu-
tional positions, but also political interests. Congressmen sympa-
thetic to the Secretaries apparently favored their appearance
before the House. Nevertheless, the House rejected the motion for
a variety of stated reasons, among them the impracticality of an
investigation by the House as such figured prominently.
The vote led Secretary Knox to write to the Speaker asking for
permission to appear before the House. Samuel Hodgden, who had
been Quartermaster General during the poor provisioning of St.
Clair's army, wrote a similar request. When the House discussed
these requests, Madison suggested recommitment of the report to
the select committee, which could then hear Knox and Hodgden.
The House agreed to this, although Ames had argued strongly to
provide an opportunity for vindication: "Shall they be sent to a
Committee-room, and make their defence . . . in the hearing of
perhaps ten or a dozen persons only?"99
The account of Madison's opposition to the motion to invite Sec-
retaries Hamilton and Knox to appear before the House in the Ga-
zette of the U.S. stated:
Mr. Madison objected to the motion on constitutional
grounds, and as being contrary to the practice of the house. He
had not, he said, thoroughly resolved the business in his own
mind, and therefore was not prepared to state fully the effects
which would result from the adoption of the resolution; but he
would hazard thus much, that it would form an innovation in
97. Id. at 680-81 (statement of Rep. Ames).
98. Id. at 683 (statement of Rep. Venable).
99. Id. at 686 (statement of Rep. Ames).
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the mode of conducting the business of this house, and intro-
duce a precedent which would lead to perplexing and embarrass-
ing consequences; as it involved a conclusion in respect to the
principles of the government, which, at an earlier day, would
have been revolted from. He was decidedly in favour of written
information. 100
Although this summary is more suggestive than clear, it shows at
least that Madison viewed the personal appearance of cabinet
members as involving the very "principles of the government" as
they had emerged. 01 What had emerged, as illustrated by the St.
Clair episode, in particular, was a mode of interaction to some ex-
tent at arms length, although personal interaction was considered
appropriate at the committee level. What also had emerged was
the President's control of the executive branch and therefore of the
information to be provided the legislature. In the cabinet meeting
about the St. Clair investigation, only Hamilton had invoked, not
implausibly, a more direct relation with the House."0 2
The issues of what information Congress was entitled to, and
what conditions could be placed on its circulation, were more com-
plex. Abraham Sofaer correctly stated that, during the Washington
presidency, a widely shared view existed that the President had
some discretion in declining to furnish information, and that the
President was extremely careful in exercising that discretion.0 3
The President also claimed the right to communicate with the
Congress on a confidential basis. Although this exercise presented
few difficulties with the early Senate, which until 1794 met behind
closed doors, the House ordinarily met in public and its debates
were widely reported in newspapers. Nevertheless, the House occa-
sionally went into closed session to receive confidential communi-
cations from the President. During the Second Congress this pro-
cedure was formalized into a standing rule providing that
"whenever confidential communications are received from the
President of the United States" the House was to be cleared dur-
100. 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 406.
101. Id.
102. THE CoMPLETE ANAS oF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 93, at 71.
103. See A. SoFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 79-
93 (1976).
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ing the reading and all debates.104 This House rule, in effect,
granted the President control of an important aspect of the man-
ner in which the House conducted its business. During the consid-
eration of American relations with the Barbary Powers, the matter
was reopened and it was argued that the rule violated the public's
right to know: "[S]ecrecy in a Republican Government wounds the
majesty of the sovereign people." 05 The reply was "that because
this Government is Republican, it will not be pretended that it can
have no secrets."'10 6 Indeed, the journal secrecy clause in article I,
section 5 of the Constitution supports the latter proposition. The
Constitution did not commit the country to the free circulation of
information at any price. Nevertheless, the problem was not se-
crecy as such, but the Executive's control over House deliberations.
On December 30, 1793, the House amended its rule to provide for
two phases: closed door reading of confidential communications
from the President and closed door debate "unless otherwise di-
rected by the House.' 110 7
What is striking as one reviews these early instances of interac-
tion between the Congress and the executive branch is the care
with which arguments were phrased and how both branches appre-
ciated the precedent-setting nature of contemplated action. In-
deed, precedents for the modes and conditions of communication
were set, which-for better or for worse-essentially endure to the
present day. The separation of powers doctrine hardly compelled
these precedents. Yet, the episodes under discussion display an in-
clination to maintain some distance between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches in accord with the distinct responsibilities in a
complex system of representative government. At the turn from
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century this symbolic distancing
was expanded by the physical distance between the two branches
in the new capital city. 08 One must, however, be on guard against
overrating the importance of this distancing for the government's
substantive decision making. As we shall see, the realities of the
104. 3 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 91, at 414.
105. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 150 (1794).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 151. See D. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
100-04 (1981).
108. See J. YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800-1828, at 6 (1966).
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constitutional coordination of the governmental institutions in
cases such as financial planning and foreign policy quickly over-
came more barren notions of separation.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT
William Maclay had this to say about the bills establishing the
executive departments:
[I do not] see the necessity of having made this business a sub-
ject of legislation. The point of view in which it has presented
itself to me was that the President should signify to the Senate
his desire of appointing a Minister of Foreign Affairs, and nomi-
nate the man. And so of the other necessary departments. If the
Senate agreed to the necessity of the office and the men, they
would concur; if not, they would negative, etc. The House would
get the business before them when salaries came to be ap-
pointed, and could thus give their opinion by providing for the
officers or not.109
Maclay's approach adapted to American constitutional conditions
the manner in which the great offices of state had emerged in Eng-
land-from the King's privy council. The officers came before the
offices. 1 0 In the House of Representatives, on the other hand, that
the principles of organization for the executive offices should be
settled by legislation was taken for granted. The tenure of the of-
ficers that would head the departments thus established was the
great separation of powers issue that overshadowed all other issues
in the spring of 1789. Its resolution has become known as "the de-
cision of 1789."
The constitutional arrangements in the states had little rele-
vance to the debate. The manner in which the state constitutions
had dealt with appointments, terms of office, and removal did not
suggest a consensus of any kind. Important officers were frequently
elected by the legislature for one year or for more extended terms.
Councils shared gubernatorial appointment powers that were sub-
ject to various legislative controls, including displacement. The
constitutions only occasionally included the phrase "service during
109. E. MACLAY, supra note 68, at 101.
110. See F. MAITLAND, THE CONsTrrUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 387-99 (1926).
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pleasure." On the whole, the state rules were so diverse as to defy
any synthesis."i No clear-cut state precedents were available to
the members of the House of Representatives as they faced the
task of interpreting the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion with respect to the tenure of executive officers.
On May 19, after Boudinot had introduced the subject, Madison
moved that Congress establish departments of Foreign Affairs,
Treasury, and War. The departments were to be led by secretaries,
who were to be "appointed by the President, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate; and to be removable by the Presi-
dent." '112 The motion immediately focused attention on the loca-
tion of the removal power. In the subsequent debate, two major
issues emerged: (1) the substantive issue, and (2) the question
whether Congress, especially the House of Representatives, should
declare its views on the correct interpretation of the
Constitution. 13
Louis Fisher has rightly emphasized the wide-ranging nature of
the debate, the complexity of the issues, and the shifting tide of
opinion "that advanced and receded each day as the deliberation
continued. 11 4 Nevertheless, the following major positions can be
identified on the question of the location of the removal power:
1. Removal was possible only by means of impeachment.
2. The removal power belonged to the President because the
Constitution did not provide otherwise and because the Sen-
ate was not expressly associated with it.
3. The removal power belonged to the President because it
was an inherently executive power. The Senate was a legisla-
tive body with only a qualified check over the executive
power.
4. The removal power belonged to the President because the
President, under the Constitution, is answerable for the con-
duct of his officers.
111. See Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1051-57 (1987).
112. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 370-71.
113. See id. at 372-82.
114. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 60-61
(1985).
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5. The removal power was shared by the President and Sen-
ate because of its similarity to the appointment power, which
was also shared. 5
6. Congress could delegate the removal power to the Presi-
dent because of its power over offices and the terms of
office.116
7. Congress had discretion in the matter on account of its
powers under the necessary and proper clause.
The debate was replete with references to separation of powers.
The views of James Madison and Stone of Maryland respectively
characterize two extremes. First, Madison's opinion:
Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or
more plausibly grounded, against the constitution, under which
we are now deliberating, than that founded on the mingling of
the executive and legislative branches of the government in one
body. It has been objected, that the senate have too much of the
executive power even, by having a controul over the president in
the appointment to office. Now, shall we extend this connection
between the legislative and executive departments, which will
strengthen the objection, and diminish the responsibility we
have in the head of the executive? I cannot but believe, if gen-
tlemen weigh well these considerations, they will think it safe
and expedient to adopt the clause.' 17
Issues of constitutional power aside, Madison's position was clearly
based on separation of powers notions. Stone considered such ar-
guments as too late:
A separation of the powers of Government, between the Legis-
lative, Executive, and Judicial branches, is considered as the
proper ground for our opinion, and a principle which we must
admit. Are we to get it brought into the Constitution? For I ap-
prehend there is no such principle as a separation of those pow-
ers brought into the Constitution at present, but to the degree
which an examination will appear to exist. Is there any express
declaration, that it is a principle of the Constitution to keep the
115. This is the position taken by Hamilton. See THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 484-89 (A.
Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
116. This suggestion Was one of the various ones put forth by Madison.
117. 12 THE PAPERs OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 174.
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Legislative and Executive powers distinct? No. Has the Consti-
tution in practice kept them separate? No. Whence is this idea
drawn? That it is a principle in this Constitution, that the pow-
ers of Government should be kept separate? No sure ground is
afforded for it in the Constitution itself. It is found in the cele-
brated writers on government; and, in general, I conceive the
principle to be a good one. But if no such principle is declared in
the Constitution, and that instrument has adopted exceptions, I
think we ought to follow those exceptions, step by step, in every
case to which they bear relation.""
In addition to the question of the significance of the separation
of powers doctrine for the Constitution and the removal power,
some members of the House doubted whether Congress should
make any declaration as to the allocation of constitutional powers.
Smith of South Carolina, who opposed presidential removal,
thought the issue should be left to the judiciary: "It will be time
enough to determine the question when the President shall remove
an officer in this way."" 9 Gerry, who believed in the similarity of
the removal and appointments powers, wanted the clause "to be
removable by the President" stricken, partially because he be-
lieved that the legislature should have no power to construe the
meaning of the Constitution.'20 He did assume that the judiciary
had the power of exposition. 12' As far as the Congress was con-
cerned, it could act only by amendment pursuant to article V.' 22
In response to this proposition, Benson pointed out the impossi-
bility of avoiding all construction of the Constitution. At the same
time, he notified the House that he would move for new language,
in order to destroy all appearance that Congress was conferring the
power of removal on the President. Such a conferral "would be ad-
mitting the House to be possessed of an authority which would de-
stroy those checks and balances which are cautiously introduced
into the Constitution, to prevent an amalgamation of the legisla-
tive and executive powers.' 23
118. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 564-65 (statement of Rep. Stone).
119. Id. at 459 (statement of Rep. Smith).
120. Id. at 573 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
121. Id. at 573-76.
122. Id. at 503.
123. Id. at 505 (statement of Rep. Benson).
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On June 19, a motion to strike out the words "to be removable
by the President" was defeated 20 to 34.124 On June 22, Benson
introduced his amendment to the House, which ingeniously was
based on indirection. Specifically, it gave the chief clerk of the de-
partment the custody of all records "whenever the said principal
officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United
States, or in any other case of vacancy. '125 The motion was carried
30 to 18.12' After its adoption, in accord with his previously an-
nounced plan, Benson moved to strike out the clause "to be remov-
able by the President. ' 127 The motion was carried 31 to 19.125 The
"decision of 1789" was later sealed in an evenly split Senate, with
the Vice President casting the decisive vote.129
Short of a roll-call analysis of the shifting alliances, which would
be hampered by the fact that by no means all members of the
House participated in the debates and that we have no reliable ac-
count of Senate proceedings, knowing how decisive the decision
was and its exact meaning is difficult.130 In any event, this is not a
very interesting pursuit, because the real significance of the debate
lies in the multitude of views expressed about the significance and
meaning of separation of powers. In some way, most speakers, in-
cluding Madison, as is evidenced in the quoted passage,13 1 recog-
nized that distillation of a constitutional separation of powers doc-
trine that was supported by the constitutional text was difficult.
This awareness. led Madison and Benson to argue that "amalgama-
tion" had been carried far enough and that doubtful cases should
be resolved in favor of more separation and a more effective and
responsible executive branch. Yet, the contrary arguments were
hardly frivolous as they expressed a preference for construing the
Constitution rather than relying on "celebrated writers on govern-
124. Id. at 576.
125. Id. at 578.
126. Id. at 580.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 585.
129. For the various Senate votes, see L. FISHER, supra note 114, at 65.
130. For a detailed analysis, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF His-
TORY 205-10 (1969).
131. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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ment.' 132 Furthermore, how responsibility and efficacy could best
be achieved in different contexts was by no means clear.
Madison himself provides a striking illustration of this last
point. Only one week after the vote on the Benson motion,
Madison rose in the House during the debate on the bill establish-
ing the Treasury Department. The bill provided for a Comptroller,
whose duties included deciding, on appeal, without further review
by the Secretary, all claims concerning the settlement of accounts.
The bill made no special provisions concerning the tenure of the
Comptroller.'3 3 Madison, in analyzing the "properties" of the of-
fice, found them to be "not purely of an executive nature.'
3 4
It seems to me that they partake of a judiciary quality as well as
executive, perhaps the latter obtains in the greatest degree. The
principal duty seems to be deciding upon the lawfulness and jus-
tice of the claims and accounts subsisting between the United
States and the particular citizens; this partakes strongly of the
judicial character, and there may be strong reasons why an of-
ficer of this kind should not hold his office at the pleasure of the
executive branch of the government ....
Whatever, Mr. Chairman, may be my opinion with respect to
the tenure by which an executive officer may hold his office ac-
cording to the meaning of the constitution, I am very well satis-
fied, that a modification by the legislature may take place in
such as partake of the judicial qualities, and that the legislative
power is sufficient to establish this office on such a footing, as to
answer the purposes for which it is prescribed. 13 1
Madison proposed tenure for a term of years, although, somewhat
surprisingly after his opening words, he would still allow the Presi-
dent to remove the Comptroller. The officer was to be reappoint-
able. The point of the scheme was to establish the Comptroller's
dependence on the President, through the removal power, on the
Senate, through reconfirmation, and on the House, through im-
peachment and the power over his salary.
3 1
132. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 565 (statement of Rep. Stone).
133. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 265.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 265-66.
136. Id. at 266.
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Madison's intervention revealed the complexity of any classifica-
tion scheme. Later in the debate, he conceded that the office was
neither executive nor judicial, but "distinct from both. '137
Madison's intervention also showed that the views he had adum-
brated at the beginning of the removal debate concerning congres-
sional power over offices138 were a function of the different organi-
zational tasks confronted by the legislature.
Madison's rather unclear measure for protecting the Comptroller
against "interference in the settling and adjusting" of legal claims
against the United States was seen by other members as, in Ben-
son's words, "setting afloat the question which had already been
carried"-service in the executive branch during pleasure. 3 9 In
short, some feared that Madison had stirred up a hornet's nest
and, the next day, he withdrew the proposition.'40
The real decisions of 1789 are those embodied in the statutes
establishing the "great departments" of government. These stat-
utes are of considerable interest beyond the fact that they recog-
nized a presidential removal power. Three departments-Foreign
Affairs, War, and Treasury-were established that were the direct
successors to those of the Continental Congress. The departments
of Foreign Affairs and War were denominated "executive" depart-
ments, and thus were placed squarely within the executive branch.
Although areas of responsibility were spelled out, the secretaries
were subjected explicitly to presidential directions: the principal
officer "shall conduct the business of the ... department in such
manner as the President of the United States shall from time to
time order or instruct."'' The initial organization of the depart-
ments was skeletal, with only a chief clerk named expressly.
137. Id. at 267.
138. Id. at 172-74.
139. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 612-14.
140. Id. at 615.
141. An Act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, 1 Stat. 28-29 (1789); An Act to establish an Executive Department,
to be denominated the Department of War, 1 Stat. 49-50 (1789). The Department of For-
eign Affairs was subsequently given additional responsibilities and in effect, once it was
renamed the Department of State, became the "Home Department" that the parsimonious
First Congress rejected. On the far-reaching responsibilities of the State Department
(which, in the absence of a Justice Department, included administration of the court sys-
tem), see L. WHrrE, THE FEDERALISTS 128-44 (1978).
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Matters were completely different as to the Department of Trea-
sury. The Treasury was not referred to as an "executive" depart-
ment, even though the Secretary of the Treasury was grouped with
other "executive officers" in the act setting salaries142 and the Sec-
retary was removable by the President. The legislation was silent
on the subject of presidential direction, yet did not vest the ap-
pointment of inferior officers in the Secretary. An elaborate set of
such officers and their responsibilities was spelled out in detail.
The officers included an assistant secretary, a comptroller, an audi-
tor, a treasurer, and a register, who were subjected to a detailed
system of controls. For instance, disbursement could be made only
by the Treasurer, upon warrants signed by the Secretary, counter-
signed by the Comptroller, and recorded by the Register. 43
The duties of the Secretary, as defined by the legislation, were
extensive and involved direct relations with the Congress:
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of
the Secretary of the Treasury to digest and prepare plans for the
improvement and management of the revenue, and for the sup-
port of public credit; to prepare and report estimates of public
revenue, and the public expenditures; to superintend the collec-
tion of the revenue; to decide on the forms of keeping and stat-
ing accounts and making returns, and to grant under the limita-
tions herein established, or to be hereafter provided, all
warrants for monies to be issued from the Treasury, in pursu-
ance of appropriations by law; to execute such services relative
to the sale of the lands belonging to the United States, as may
be by law required of him; (a) to make report, and give informa-
tion to either branch of the legislature, in person or in writing
(as he may be required), respecting all matters referred to him
by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall ap-
pertain to his office; and generally to perform all such services
relative to the finances, as he shall be directed to perform. 44
142. An Act for establishing the Salaries of the Executive Officers of Government, with
their Assistants and Clerks, 1 Stat. 67 (1789).
143. An Act to establish the Treasury Department. Id. at 65-67. See generally L. WHiTE,
supra note 141, at 116-27 (describing Treasury operations).
144. 1 Stat. 65-66 (1789).
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As Forrest McDonald put it, "Hamilton could scarcely have
asked for more." 14 5 Although we shall never know the exact influ-
ence that Hamilton had on the shape of the legislation, the direct
link that the act created between the Secretary and the Congress
had ample state precedent. Even in New York, a state in which the
constitution was more generous than any other toward the execu-
tive branch, the treasurer was "appointed by act of the legislature,
to originate with the assembly.' 1 46 One should also recall that until
September 14, 1787, the draft of the federal Constitution provided
for the election of the Treasurer.
147
In the Congress, the Secretary of Treasury was seen as an indis-
pensable, direct arm of the House in regard to its responsibilities
for revenues and appropriations. The House had appointed a Com-
mittee of Ways and Means as early as July 24, 1789.148 As soon as
Hamilton was confirmed, the House turned the Committee's task
over to him and discharged the Committee.149 The House did not
establish a standing Committee on Ways and Means until 1795.150
Whatever the constitutional significance of the different treat-
ment accorded the Treasury Department, its symbolic significance
for the separation of powers seems considerable. Only the depart-
ments of State and War were completely "executive" in nature. As
to the Treasury, although Congress did not exclude the President
from giving orders and instructions to its Secretary, it claimed that
authority for itself and did not even mention the President in this
respect. This fact made presidential control of the Secretary more
tenuous, as Hamilton had been quick to point out when the cabi-
net discussed the proper response to the St. Clair inquiry.15' Con-
gress certainly did not demand part of the power to execute the
laws, but it varied the instruments for executing its own powers
and those of the executive branch, in accordance with the subject
matter to be regulated and its own sense of the legislature's re-
sponsibilities with respect to that subject matter. Put differently,
145. F. McDONALD, supra note 84, at 133.
146. 5 F. THORPE, supra note 6, at 2633 (1777 N.Y. CONST. art. XXII).
147. See supra text accompanying note 59.
148. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 47, at 670-71.
149. Id. at 894-95.
150. N. CUNNINGHAM, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT UNDER JEFFERSON 216 (1978).
151. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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Congress stressed coordination rather than separation as it seemed
constitutionally appropriate.
V. THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, AND THE ALGIERS PROBLEM
On the 25th of July, 1785, the schooner Maria, captain Stevens,
belonging to a Mr. Foster, of Boston, was taken off Cape St.
Vincents, by an Algerine corsair; and, five days afterwards, the
ship Dauphin, captain O'Brien, belonging to Messieurs Irvins of
Philadelphia, was taken by another Algerine, about fifty leagues
westward of Lisbon. These vessels, with their cargoes and crew,
twenty-one persons in number, were carried into Algiers.'52
With these words, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson described
an event that posed one of the most intractable foreign policy
problems the new country encountered, one which would occupy
the Washington administration throughout its eight years. The Al-
giers episode illustrates vividly the foreign policy issues that arise
under a system characterized by a three-way (executive, Senate,
House) allocation of decision-making authority. In evaluating its
significance, one must keep in mind that one of the framers' cen-
tral purposes in establishing the federal government was the effec-
tive and controlled conduct of foreign and defense policy.
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were autonomous regencies of the Ot-
toman empire, governed by a local and regularly replenished mili-
tary establishment of Turks and financed by tributes from country
tribes, agricultural trade, and piracy. For the purposes of piracy,
fleets of cruisers were maintained under Turkish sea captains. The
piracy policy was one of declaring "war" on countries big and
small, taking ships and seamen captive, putting the "slaves" to
work, and then selling "peace." A fourth participant in these activ-
ities was Morocco, an independent state under a Sultan. These
four powers, the "Barbary Powers," exercised considerable control
over Mediterranean and Atlantic shipping.153 Because England
152. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 100 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds.
1832).
153. For two detailed accounts of the Algiers episode, see R. IRWIN, THE DIPLOMATIC RE-
LATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE BARBARY POWERS 1776-1816 (1931) and H.G.
BARNBY, THE PRISONERS OF ALGIERS (1966).
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withdrew her Mediterranean passes for American ships shortly af-
ter the outbreak of the War of Independence, the "American
Revolution transferred from London to Philadelphia the problem
of protecting American commerce."154
In 1784 the Continental Congress resolved to secure treaties with
Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Indeed, a fifty-year treaty
was concluded with Morocco in 1787.155 However, negotiations with
the other Barbary Powers collapsed and the capture of the Maria
and Dauphin exacerbated the problem.
The Continental Congress commissioned John Adams, Benjamin
Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson to negotiate with the Barbary
Powers. When these men sent an agent to Algiers, its ruler, the
Dey, demanded a $60,000 ransom. This sum amounted to more
than $2,800 a head, considerably above the $200 that the Commis-
sioners had offered or the $550 that Jefferson was willing to pay in
September of 1788, when he employed the services of a French re-
ligious order to recover the hostages. In March of 1790, Jefferson
took up his new position of Secretary of State. The House of Rep-
resentatives referred to the Secretary a petition for relief concern-
ing the American captives in Algiers.' 56 At this point it becomes
interesting to explore the manner in which the executive branch
and Congress interacted to find a solution.
On December 30, 1790, the President sent both houses of Con-
gress a report on the prisoners of Algiers which the House had re-
quested. The Secretary of State had prepared the report for the
President. On the same date, Jefferson also sent the House a re-
port on Mediterranean trade. The Secretary of State had prepared
the latter report at the request of the House following the Presi-
dent's annual speech to his "Fellow Citizens of the Senate and
House of Representatives" on December 8.157 During that address,
the President called the Congressmen's attention to the "distress-
ful" state of the Mediterranean trade.'58
Washington's cover letter accompanying the first report said: "I
lay before you a report of the Secretary of State on the subject of
154. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 20.
155. Id. at 28-33.
156. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 101.
157. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1728 (1790).
158. Id. at 1730.
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the citizens of the United States in captivity at Algiers, that you
may provide on their behalf, what to you shall seem most expedi-
ent. ' 159 Jefferson's report consisted of a detailed account of diplo-
matic activities since the days of the Continental Congress, as well
as of the "market" in Algerine captives-the per capita ransom
paid by various European states.' Jefferson stated somewhat la-
conically that from "these facts and opinions, some conjecture may
be formed of the terms on which the liberty of our citizens may be
obtained.' 6' He also pointed to the alternative of meeting force
with force, suggesting the capture of Algerine mariners, or better
still, Turks, for purposes of exchange. Jefferson concluded by em-
phasizing the connection of the subject matter at hand with "the
liberation of our commerce in the Mediterranean."' 2 The report
was accompanied by extracts from diplomatic and other correspon-
dence 6 3  which had received some "judicious editing" by
Jefferson.16 4
In response to a House request, Jefferson sent the report on
Mediterranean trade directly to the House after the President had
approved it. In his report, Jefferson provided information about
the importance of the Mediterranean ports for the United States
agricultural exports before the war. He stressed that navigation
had not been resumed at all since the peace and discussed alterna-
tives for coping with the situation, including the option "to obtain
peace by purchasing it."'65 Jefferson relayed the opinion of a Euro-
pean source, "whose name is not free to be mentioned here, 166
that the United States could not buy peace with Algiers for less
than a million dollars. 67
159. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 100 (emphasis
added).
160. Prices ranged from $1,200 to $2,920 a man. See id. at 101.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See list in 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 435-36 (J. Boyd ed. 1971) (editorial
note).
164. Id. at 404 (editorial note).
165. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 104.
166. Id. at 105.
167. In the end, the opinion turned out to be exceedingly accurate.
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Finally, Jefferson discussed "repel[ling] force by force" as an al-
ternative.'6 8 He provided estimates of the strength of the Algerine
naval force, suggested that the United States needed a naval force
equal to it, and put forward the idea of an alliance with other
countries. He pointed to the fact that Portugal, by keeping a naval
watch before the Straits of Gibraltar, had contained the Algerines
within the Mediterranean. "Should Portugal effect a peace with
them, as has been apprehended for some time, the Atlantic will
immediately become the principal scene of their piracies."' 9 Jef-
ferson concluded:
Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war,
tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Medi-
terranean commerce. If war, they will consider how far our own
resources shall be called forth, and how far they will enable the
Executive to engage, in the forms of the constitution, the co-
operation of other Powers. If tribute or ransom, it will rest with
them to limit and provide the amount; and with the Executive,
observing the same constitutional forms, to make arrangements
for employing it to the best advantage. 170
The report was so structured that Jefferson, while treating the
alternatives fairly, made it clear where he stood (and, indeed had
stood all along): giving in to ransom demands would only en-
courage further extortion. The report was again accompanied by a
range of diplomatic and other correspondence.17 1
Jefferson submitted the report with a request to the Speaker of
the House that it be treated as a secret document, because it was
not in the interest of the United States that countries at peace
with Algiers learn about American plans for concerted action. The
galleries were indeed cleared and the House forwarded the report
to the Senate on a confidential basis. 7 2
When the Senate received Jefferson's report on January 3, Ma-
clay thought it breathed resentment and abounded "with martial
168. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 105.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 18 THE PAPERS OF THOmAS JEFFERSON, supra note 163, at 429-30 (editorial note).
172. Id. at 410 (editorial note), 436-37.
1989]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
estimates in a naval way."'' 3 Three days later, a Senate committee
found that a naval force was necessary "and that it will be proper
to resort to the same as soon as the state of the public finances will
admit.' 711 4 The committee was headed by Jefferson's friend Lang-
don and included Senators who were sympathetic to Hamiltonian
trade policy. 1'
On February 1, 1791, the Senate adopted a resolution that
the Senate advise and consent that the President of the United
States take such measures as he may think necessary for the re-
demption of the citizens of the United States now in captivity at
Algiers, provided the expense shall not exceed forty thousand
dollars; and, also, that measures be taken to confirm the treaty
now existing between the United States and the Emperor of
Morocco. 176
The last item referred to the fact that the Sultan had died and a
customary payment was due his successor. The President re-
sponded to the Senate in a message dated February 22 in which he
said he would act "in conformity with your resolution of advice" as
soon as the necessary moneys were appropriated and ready.'77 By a
special appropriations act of March 3, 1791, Congress appropriated
$20,000 for the Moroccan treaty. 7 8 No further steps were taken
concerning a naval force or the Algiers prisoners, however.7 9
This first set of interactions between the executive branch and
Congress was marked by a straightforward, detailed, and, on the
whole, complete executive branch account to the Congress of the
state of affairs. s0 It illustrated the President's inclination to wait
for congressional judgment as well as Jefferson's inclination to
make recommendations. No doubt was entertained about the ulti-
mate authority of the Congress. Furthermore, both branches dis-
173. E. MACLAY, supra note 68, at 353.
174. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 108.
175. 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 163, at 410 (editorial note).
176. 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 157, at 1735.
177. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 128.
178. An Act making an appropriation for the purpose therein mentioned, 1 Stat. 214
(1791).
179. For a detailed account, see 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 163, at
410-13 (editorial note).
180. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 68, 79.
[Vol. 30:211246
EARLY VERSIONS AND PRACTICES
played a consensus that, at times, the interests of the country de-
manded secrecy. Perhaps the most important aspect is that, at the
outset, the executive branch, because any solution depended on
appropriations, recognized the need to deal with Congress as a
whole. This last matter became controversial in the spring of 1792.
The previous December, Jefferson had forwarded new informa-
tion to the Senate that suggested that accession of a new Dey in
Algiers provided a favorable moment for making a permanent ar-
rangement with the regency. Also, Captain O'Brien urged, after six
years of captivity, that something be done "to finally extricate your
fourteen unfortunate subjects from their present state of bondage
and adversity."'' Of the twenty-one original captives, some had
died and one had been privately ransomed. A Senate committee
recommended a treaty.'82
On March 11, 1792, in preparation for a meeting between the
President and Senators the next day, Washington and Jefferson
discussed whether the President could proceed with treaty negotia-
tions only with Senate authorization. These are Jefferson's notes
on his consultation with the President:
My opinions run on the following heads:
We must go to Algiers with cash in our hands. Where shall we
get it? By loan? By converting money now in the treasury?
Probably a loan might be obtained on the President's author-
ity; but as this could not be repaid without a subsequent act of
legislature, the Representatives might refuse it. So if money in
the treasury be converted, they may refuse to sanction it.
The subsequent approbation of the Senate being necessary to
validate a treaty, they expect to be consulted beforehand, if the
case admits.
So the subsequent act of the Representatives being necessary
where money is given, why should not they expect to be con-
sulted in like manner, when the case admits. A treaty is a law of
the land. But prudence will point out this difference to be at-
tended to in making them; viz. where a treaty contains such arti-
cles only as will go into execution of themselves, or be carried
into execution by the judges, they may be safely made; but
181. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 130.
182. Id. at 133.
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where there are articles which require a law to be passed after-
wards by the legislature, great caution is requisite.
For example; the consular convention with France required a
very small legislative regulation. This convention was unani-
mously ratified by the Senate. Yet the same identical men threw
by the law to enforce it at the last session, and the Representa-
tives at this session have placed it among the laws which they
may take up or not, at their own convenience, as if that was a
higher motive than the public faith.
Therefore, against hazarding this transaction without the
sanction of both Houses.
The President concurred. The Senate express the motive for
this proposition, to be a fear that the Representatives would not
keep the secret. He has no opinion of the secrecy of the
Senate.1 3
Apparently Washington met with strong resistance from the Sena-
tors, as is evidenced by Jefferson's notes from April 9:
The President had wished to redeem our captives at Algiers,
and to make peace with them on paying an annual tribute. The
Senate were willing to approve this, but unwilling to have the
lower House applied to previously to furnish the money; they
wished the President to take the money from the treasury, or
open a loan for it. They thought that to consult the Representa-
tives on one occasion, would give them a handle always to claim
it, and would let them into a participation of the power of mak-
ing treaties, which the constitution had given exclusively to the
President and Senate. They said too, that if the particular sum
was voted by the Representatives, it would not be a secret. The
President had no confidence in the secresy of the Senate, and
did not choose to take money from the treasury or to borrow.
But he agreed he would enter into provisional treaties with the
Algerines, not to be binding on us till ratified here. I prepared
questions for consultation with the Senate, and added, that the
Senate were to be apprized that on the return of the provisional
treaty, and after they should advise the ratification, he would
not have the seal put to it till the two Houses should vote the
money. He asked me if the treaty stipulating a sum and ratified
by him, with the advice of the Senate, would not be good under
183. THE COMPLETE ANAS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 93, at 63-64.
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the constitution, and obligatory on the Representatives to fur-
nish the money? I answered it certainly would, and that it would
be the duty of the Representatives to raise the money; but that
they might decline to do what was their duty, and I thought it
might be incautious to commit himself by a ratification with a
foreign nation, where he might be left in the lurch in the execu-
tion: it was possible too, to conceive a treaty, which it would not
be their duty to provide for. He said that he did not like throw-
ing too much into democratic hands, that if they would not do
what the constitution called on them to do, the government
would be at an end, and must then assume another form. He
stopped here; and I kept silence to see whether he would say
anything more in the same line, or add any qualifying expression
to soften what he had said, but he did neither.""
Washington had obviously come to the conclusion that a negoti-
ated redemption of the American prisoners was the only realistic
option. Washington and Jefferson also believed that realism, if not
constitutional necessity, made it highly desirable to have the
House approve of the negotiations beforehand. Washington was
not about to borrow the necessary money on his own authority.
The Senate insisted on having a special role and brought the need
for secrecy into play, although the President was not impressed by
the Senate's allegedly superior capacity to keep secrets. Following
behind-the-scenes discussions, all of these considerations were
brought into finely tuned balance, when on a single day, May 8,
1792, the President formally asked the Senate whether it would
approve both ransom and a treaty and if so, at what price. The
Senate advised the President that a peace treaty with Algiers not
to exceed $40,000, plus subsequent annual tribute not to exceed
$25,000, plus ransom not to exceed $40,000 would be approved."8 5
Finally, the Congress made a special appropriation of $50,000 "to
defray any expense which might be incurred in relation to the in-
tercourse between the United States and foreign nations." 86 The
purpose of this last appropriation was understood to be Algiers but
this was not publicly stated to protect the negotiations.
184. Id. at 72-73.
185. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 136.
186. Id. at 290; An Act making certain appropriations therein mentioned, 1 Stat. 284-85
(1792).
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Fearing interference from foreign countries, especially England,
which was widely thought to be hostile to American interests and
competition, the next steps were taken behind veils of extreme se-
crecy. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Pinck-
ney, the new American minister to London, were the only ones, to
know of the President's appointments of Admiral John Paul Jones,
then in London, as commissioner for negotiations with Algiers, and
of Thomas Barclay, the United States consul at Morocco, as his
substitute should Jones not be available. Detailed instructions
were issued for the negotiations. 8 '
When Pinckney arrived in London, he learned of Jones's death.
Barclay received the papers and prepared for his departure for Al-
giers, but became ill and died in Lisbon in January 1793. At the
end of March, Washington appointed the American minister to
Portugal, David Humphreys, as Commissioner. At this point the
strategic situation deteriorated considerably. At the beginning of
October 1793, in Gibraltar, Humphreys learned that the much
dreaded truce between Algiers and Portugal had been concluded
and that Algerine corsairs were on their way to the Atlantic. The
negotiations had been carried out by William Logie, the British
consul in Algiers, on behalf of Portugal, although not necessarily
with Portugal's informed consent. Edward Church, the United
States consul in Lisbon, concluded that England was responsible:
The conduct of the British in this business leaves no room to
doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us
.... As a further confirmation, it is worthy of remark, that the
same British agent obtained a truce at the same time between
the States of Holland and the Dey, for six months, whereby we
and the Hanse Towns are now left the only prey to those
barbarians.188
On December 16, the President presented to both Houses of
Congress a report from the Secretary of State that contained much
of the diplomatic correspondence. Washington requested secrecy:
While it is proper our citizens should know that subjects
which so much concern their interests and their feelings, have
187. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 288-300.
188. Id. at 296.
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duly engaged the attention of their Legislature and Executive, it
would still be improper that some particulars of this communi-
cation should be made known. The confidential conversation
stated in one of the last letters sent herewith is one of these.
Both justice and policy require that the source of that informa-
tion should remain secret. So a knowledge of the sums meant to
have been given for peace and ransom might have a disadvanta-
geous influence on future proceedings for the same objects."8 9
In connection with the House debates on the President's mes-
sage, secrecy became controversial and the House amended its
standing order in favor of House discretion.190 The issue had ac-
quired partisan overtones, with Republicans arguing for the
amendment. This was also the time of heated controversy over the
Neutrality Proclamation, the alliance with France, and relations
with Great Britain. Nevertheless, after adoption of the amend-
ment, the House defeated a motion to go into public session on
Algiers by a one-vote margin.191 Indeed, on January 2, 1794, the
House adopted secret resolutions authorizing additional money for
the negotiations and calling for a naval force, "adequate to the pro-
tection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine
corsairs."1 92 The House lifted the injunction of secrecy concerning
these resolutions on January 7, and requested a committee to edit
the President's communication in accord with his suggestions.
That task was accomplished by February 6.193
While Congress was considering possible responses to the
changed circumstances, the administration received new informa-
tion that made matters even worse. The President forwarded this
information, on a confidential basis, on March 3, 1794.194 During
October and November, Algiers had taken eleven American vessels
and 105 American seamen captive in the Atlantic19 and the Dey
had firmly refused any negotiations with the United States. Con-
gress was bombarded with petitions not only from the hostages,
189. Id. at 288.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
191. See the account in D. HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 100-04.
192. 4 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 105, at 154.
193. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 102.
194. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAEFRS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 413-23.
195. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 60.
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but also from merchants calling for adequate naval protection.'
Insurance rates on American shipping increased from ten to thirty
percent.197
In a letter to Humphreys, Pierre Eric Skjoldebrand, brother of
the Swedish Consul in Algiers and an informal American agent,
held out some hope that, if the Dey could be talked to in a
"favorable" moment, matters might be settled.9e Apparently, on
this basis, it was decided that Congress should make further efforts
for a negotiated peace providing realistic amounts of ransom and
naval armament.
Since 1790, Congress had made $40,000 available annually for
"intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," and
had given the President discretion not to account specifically for
such expenditures that he thought it inadvisable to make public. 99
The latter procedure was regularized in 1793 by a formal system of
certificates that were deemed to be a "sufficient voucher. '20 0 On
March 20, 1794, Congress appropriated one million dollars in addi-
tion to all previous appropriations "to defray any expenses which
may be incurred, in relation to the intercourse between the United
States and foreign nations." 0' 1 The legislation included authority
to borrow the amount needed and called for an account of the ex-
penditures "as soon as may be."20 2 That it was almost half as much
as regular 1794 appropriations for the support of the government
and the military establishment gives a sense of the magnitude of
this appropriation for a vaguely stated purpose.20 3
196. See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 105, at 481.
197. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 60.
198. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 415.
199. An Act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations, 1 Stat. 128-29 (1790).
200. An Act to continue in force for a limited time, and to amend the act intituled "An
Act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," 1
Stat. 299-300 (1793).
201. An Act making further provision for the expenses attending the intercourse of the
United States with foreign nations; and further to continue in force the act intituled, "An
act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," 1
Stat. 345 (1794).
202. Id.
203. See An Act making Appropriations for the support of Government, for the year one
thousand seven hundred and ninety four, 1 Stat. 342-45 (1794); An Act making appropria-
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A naval bill called for additional moneys. Almost three months
after he had left the office of Secretary of State, Jefferson, in a
limited way, got what he had requested three years earlier, and
what he would use during his own Presidency-a naval force to
deal with the Barbary Powers. The proposal was, on the whole, not
very popular in the House. Madison opposed it, arguing that it
would be cheaper to purchase peace." If the British were behind
Algiers, as was widely assumed although not proven, then such a
fleet would increase the danger of war with England. 0 5 Madison
thus attempted to undercut the Federalists, who favored the naval
bill, by linking the Algiers issue to the greater dispute over rela-
tions with England and France.0 6 The House nevertheless ap-
proved the bill by an eleven-vote majority. The act of March 27,
1794 authorized six ships, but also provided that the program
should be dropped if "a peace shall take place between the United
States and the Regency of Algiers. ' ' 20 7 Congress assigned priority to
the negotiations.
The President took immediate steps to implement the legisla-
tion.208 When a peace treaty with Algiers was eventually concluded,
'Congress reduced the ship-building program to three frigates that
were launched in 1797.209 The entire expense for building, arming,
and keeping the ships in commission for the years 1794 to 1798
was about $2.5 million.21 Irwin has argued that the great expense
was, however, dwarfed by the savings in insurance premiums fol-
lowing the launching of the frigates.211
After considerable further difficulties, Humphreys' agent for
these negotiations, Joseph Donaldson, agreed to a treaty at the end
of 1795. Humphreys approved the treaty, "reserving the same, nev-
ertheless, for the final ratification of the President of the United
States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
tions for the support of the Military establishment of the United States, for the year one
thousand seven hundred and ninety four, 1 Stat. 346-47 (1794).
204. 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 147 (editorial note).
205. Id. at 249.
206. See id. at 147 (editorial note).
207. An Act to provide a Naval Armament, 1 Stat. 350-51 (1794).
208. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 66.
209. These frigates were the United States, the Constitution, and the Constellation.
210. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 79.
211. Id.
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ate." '212 The terms had used up more money than Congress had
appropriated and included maritime and military stores; in short,
it was "cash and arms for hostages." '213
The President submitted the treaty to the Senate on February
15, 1796 with much of the diplomatic correspondence.2 14 It was
promptly ratified. When the efforts to secure the necessary gold
and silver in the war-torn European markets caused delays, the
Dey announced that he would declare war on the United
States-the threat added a 36-gun frigate for "the Dey's daughter"
to the previous expenses.2115 On May 30, 1796, Congress appropri-
ated an additional $260,000 for treaties with the Barbary Pow-
ers.21 The surviving American hostages were released in June of
1796, some after eleven years of captivity.
The episode came to its end on February 22, 1797, when the
House voted for still more appropriations, this time in the amount
of approximately $350,000,217 for a total of Algiers expenditures in
excess of one and a half million dollars. In opening the session of
Congress, Washington had said:
After many delays and disappointments, arising out of the Euro-
pean war, the final arrangements for the fulfilling of the engage-
ments made to the Dey and Regency of Algiers, will, in all pre-
sent appearance, be crowned with success, but under great,
though inevitable disadvantages in the pecuniary transactions,
occasioned by that war, which will render a further provision
necessary.21s
The House resolved first to call for an accounting.219 The President
responded within a week, submitting to both Houses, "in confi-
dence," detailed reports from the Secretaries of State and Trea-
212. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 532.
213. For the colorful details, see H.G. BARNBY, supra note 153, at 191-98.
214. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 529-32.
215. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 74.
216. An Act making further provision for the expenses attending the intercourse of the
United States with foreign nations; and to continue in force the act, intituled "An act pro-
viding the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," 1 Stat. 487-
88 (1796).
217. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2245-46 (1797).
218. Id. at 1764.
219. Id. at 1763-67.
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sury. On February 21, 1797, the House, after a secret debate on the
appropriations, voted overwhelmingly that the injunction of se-
crecy imposed on the report be lifted and "that all future debates
and proceedings thereon be had with open doors."220 However, it
exempted from publication an important letter detailing the mat-
ters of the additional frigate and payments made to various Alge-
rine officials and an Algerine banker who had served as a go-be-
tween and financial broker. 221
The United States's first encounter with hostage-taking had en-
ded. The plight of the captives, merchant pressure, lack of a navy,
geographical distance, and the European wars had forced the
United States to behave in the same manner in which many, more
important, European powers had behaved for a long time. When
Jefferson, as President, faced the problem anew after the Bashaw
of Tripoli declared war in 1801, he sent the navy.222 He justified his
action as a training exercise, invoking an act of Congress passed
during the last session of the Adams administration providing for a
"Naval Peace Establishment. '2 23 Sending the navy helped to some
extent. The Bashaw, following the grounding of the frigate Phila-
delphia, captured more than 300 American seamen for whom the
United States, as the result of a peace treaty in 1805, paid only
$60,000 in ransom. That amount was much less than the three mil-
lion dollars originally demanded by the Bashaw or the amount that
was previously paid to Algiers.
Relations with Algiers began to sour once again in 1812. New
hostages were taken. On February 23, 1815, Madison asked Con-
gress for a declaration of war.224 Congress responded on March 3,
not with a formal declaration of war, but with legislation authoriz-
ing the President to employ "such of the armed vessels of the
United States as may be judged requisite."22 This time it was the
United States's turn to dictate a peace treaty to the Dey on "un-
220. Id. at 2235.
221. Id. at 2235-45.
222. See 5 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TiaM 37-49 (1974).
223. A. SOFAER, supra note 103, at 210.
224. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 269 (1815) (Message of Pres. Madison).
225. Id. at 1943.
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precedented" terms.226 When the Dey reneged on that treaty, Pres-
ident Madison, in his annual message on December 3, 1816, ad-
vised Congress that he would use naval force, if necessary.22 The
United States compelled the Dey, on December 23, to sign yet an-
other treaty. 28 However, given that the European powers had also
become unwilling to put up with Barbary piracy, the treaty had
become more or less irrelevant. In fact, it was forgotten in the
State Department and not submitted by President Monroe for
Senate ratification until December, 1821.229 In 1830, Algiers be-
came part of the French colonial empire.
To say that the Algiers episode is less well known than other
foreign policy issues of the Washington administration would be an
understatement. Because it did not generate the same partisan
passions as the Neutrality Proclamation or the Jay Treaty, the epi-
sode has been largely ignored. The difficulties that it posed, how-
ever, were great and intractable. Precisely because it was relatively
free of partisanship, it framed the questions concerning the distri-
bution of powers in a more detached manner. In any event, Wash-
ington's actions surrounding his unilateral proclamation of "neu-
trality" (after France had declared war against England in 1793),
and the Jay Treaty with England, concluded in 1795, displayed, by
and large, the same constitutional circumspection that character-
ized his administration's conduct with respect to the Barbary
Powers.23 o
The Constitution does not speak in such abstractions as the for-
eign affairs power or the war power. Nor, as the Washington ad-
ministration addressed the Algiers problem, were these two powers
thought of as meaningful. When Jefferson told Congress in 1790
that it had to decide "between war, tribute, and ransom," '' he
said about the latter two that Congress had the duty to limit and
provide the amount, and the Executive had the duty "to make ar-
226. 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4 (W. Lowrie & W. Franklin eds.
1834); R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 176-86.
227. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 13 (1816) (Pres. Madison's Annual Message).
228. R. IRWIN, supra note 153, at 186.
229. 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 133-34 (A. Dickens & J. Allen eds.
1858).
230. See A. SOFAER, supra note 103, at 103-16 (the Neutrality Proclamation), 85-93.
231. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 152, at 105.
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rangements for employing it to the best advantage. 2 32 In context,
this meant that negotiations and treaty drafts were the task of the
executive department, but that Congress shared responsibility and
control through its power of the purse, and the Senate, through its
treaty power.
As to Algiers, Washington sought advice 13 and advice was ren-
dered by the Senate, which set limits on the amount of ransom it
would accept as the result of negotiations.21 4 Although one may
safely assume that informal discussions lay behind formal
messages and resolutions, the administration did not proceed with
negotiations without formal authority contained in Senate resolu-
tions or congressional appropriations.235 The instructions the ad-
ministration unilaterally chose to give the commissioners were
carefully framed in accordance with the stipulated monetary limi-
tations.236 To the extent that they were exceeded, it was due to the
necessities faced by the negotiators. If Congress remained in the
dark, so did the executive due to the unsatisfactory communica-
tions system of the period. However, the Senate's treaty functions
were formally preserved by the appropriate treaty stipulations.237
The Washington administration did not always follow as strict a
course of consultations as it did during the Algiers business.
2 38 It
was quite conscious of the fact that occasionally the secrecy of dip-
lomatic overtures was the condition of success. On the other hand,
the extent to which, in general, the administration disclosed details
of foreign negotiations to the Congress and to the public at large
was remarkable and, indeed, worried some political observers.239
Frequently, Washington informed Congress by literally taking it
into "his confidence." This mode of interaction was subject to two
limitations. On the one hand, the executive branch claimed the
right to withhold information if even its limited publication would
232. Id.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 159, 186.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77, 186.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79, 202.
236. See instructions to Jones, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
152, at 290-92; instructions to Humphreys, id. at 528-29.
237. See supra text following note 211.
238. See A. SOFAER, supra note 103, at 96.
239. See 3 D. MALONE, supra note 222, at 152 (regarding Jefferson's disclosures as Secre-
tary of State).
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be against public interest.24 ° On the other hand, the House eventu-
ally claimed the right to lift injunctions of secrecy.241 Whether the
practices of the government with respect to secrecy ran counter to
the spirit of the framers' plan2 42 and the demands of popular sov-
ereignty is a difficult question. Washington displayed awareness of
these demands,243 but was also troubled by "throwing too much
into democratic hands. 2 44 On the whole, however, the administra-
tion seemed to be determined to achieve the highest possible de-
gree of coordination for American policy toward Algiers, and not
only kept Congress informed, but actually consulted it beforehand.
With regard to the respective powers of the Senate and the
House, the administration's approach in the Algiers matter was ar-
guably at some variance with the President's position in the Jay
Treaty controversy. Discussing Algiers with his Secretary of State,
Washington had raised the question of whether the House was
under a constitutional obligation to furnish moneys stipulated in a
ratified treaty. Jefferson responded that the House "certainly" had
such an obligation, but then equivocated by conceiving of hypo-
thetical treaties "which it would not be their duty to provide
for.,
245
In the summer of 1795, following the Senate's approval, with
some modification, of the Jay Treaty, Washington asked the House
to provide $90,000 to pay for arbitral commissions established by
the treaty. This action led to an intense dispute about the House's
power to demand the instructions and other documents relating to
the treaty. The very partisan debate had a somewhat "academic"
character because the Senate had received all the papers and the
House members apparently could inspect them at the Senate.24
The House overwhelmingly adopted a resolution calling for the pa-
240. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 164.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 190-91, 221.
242. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 107, at 76.
243. See supra text accompanying note 189.
244. THE COMPLETE ANAS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 93, at 73; see supra text
accompanying note 184.
245. THE COMPLETE ANAS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 93, at 73; see supra text
accompanying note 184.
246. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 625, 629 (1796).
[Vol. 30:211
EARLY VERSIONS AND PRACTICES
pers, excepting only those "as any existing negotiation may render
improper to be disclosed. 241 7
Washington refused, invoking the needs of foreign negotiations
and the constitutional separation of powers that gave the House no
role in the treaty-making process: "[It] is essential to the due ad-
ministration of the Government, that the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution between the different departments should be pre-
served.248 Earlier in his message, Washington indicated that the
situation would be different if the House contemplated impeach-
ment. He also stressed that he had "no disposition to withhold any
information which the duty of my station will permit, or the public
good shall require, to be disclosed. '2 49 This latter language could,
of course, cover the full disclosures made in connection with the
Algiers negotiations.
Jefferson, then at Monticello, seems to have remained at the
sidelines of this dispute, although he did tell Madison about the
position he had taken favoring inclusion of both branches of the
legislature in the Algiers arrangements.250 Dumas Malone, Jeffer-
son's biographer, however, has found no evidence suggesting that
Jefferson had anything to do with Virginia's proposed constitu-
tional amendment that aimed at formalizing participation of the
House in the treaty process when the subject matter of a treaty
concerned congressional powers.25'
Although the strong views that Washington expressed on this oc-
casion had already been foreshadowed vaguely in his exchange
with Jefferson at the beginning of the Algiers episode, 52 his con-
duct in the course of that drawn-out business is well summarized
by his own characterization of his overall attitude in the message
rejecting the House request for the Jay Treaty papers:
[I]t has been, as it will continue to be, while I have the honor to
preside in the Government, my constant endeavor to harmonize
with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to
247. Id. at 759.
248. Id. at 761-62.
249. Id. at 760-61. For an account of the controversy, see A. SOFAER, supra note 103, at
85-93.
250. 3 D. MALoNE, supra note 222, at 258.
251. Id. at 252.
252. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obli-
gation it imposes, to "preserve, protect, and defend the Consti-
tution," will permit. 5 '
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay has proceeded from the very general to the very spe-
cific in an effort to understand what happened to separation of
powers notions as the Washington administration faced practical
problems of governmental organization and of the conduct of gov-
ernment. These problems were all the more challenging because
the Constitution spoke about major formative issues only a little
more clearly than the separation of powers doctrine or the notion
of checks and balances.
The shaping of governmental structures began in earnest in 1789
and, of course, has not concluded to this date. Precedents were set
by the President and Congress in response to complex problems as
they occurred, and were influenced by earnest considerations of
principles and practical considerations of statecraft, but also, to be
sure, by political considerations." 4 The process was helped initially
by the relative absence of partisanship. It was also helped by the
circumspection of Washington, who has found few matches among
later Presidents in the deliberateness with which he worried about
what was right for the government as a whole, without concentrat-
ing unduly on the powers of the Presidency.
Such matters as the structure and accountability of executive
departments were handled with discretion and common sense. The
fact that Congress in general, and the House of Representatives in
particular, had the ultimate word on financial matters led to coor-
dination, even in the area of foreign policy, at least where this
seemed most necessary. The House, on the other hand, although
not recognizing an "executive privilege" as such, was sensitive to
the needs of confidentiality in the conduct of foreign policy. The
investigatory powers of the House were taken seriously by the ex-
ecutive branch. The "advisory" functions of the Senate as to ap-
253. 5 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 246, at 760.
254. For a similar assessment of relations between the judiciary and Congress, see Marcus
& Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 1789-1800, in JUDGES
AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 31 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988).
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pointments and treaties posed an intricate problem that Washing-
ton tried to solve as well as he could-although without much
success, given the awkwardness inherent in the involvement of a
legislative chamber and the exigencies of foreign negotiations. Al-
though the special responsibility of the President for the mainte-
nance of foreign relations was understood, neither the President
nor the Congress assumed that the Executive had what John
Locke, in his version of separation of powers, called the "federa-
tive" power, which pertained to foreign relations and was, by him,
classified as an executive power.255
Madison stated, in The Federalist No. 45, that the change
brought about by the new Constitution was much less the addition
of new powers to the union than the invigoration of its original
powers: "The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it
only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them."2 6
To some extent this statement may have been no more than an
argument to help make the new Constitution more acceptable. One
should remember, on the other hand, that Madison was disap-
pointed by the outcome of the Constitutional Convention and
thought that the changes made were too modest.25 In any event,
what is more striking about the issues under review here is how
much the concern of all participants was "an effectual mode of ad-
ministering" the powers of the federal government. The main ref-
erence point for this concern was the constitutional framework
rather than procrustean theories. Separation of powers notions
played a supportive role, but the views expressed were not doctri-
naire; in part because there was no clear doctrine. In general, little
single-mindedness existed. What the New Hampshire Constitution,
in its separation of powers provision, had referred to as "the chain
of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution,"215
was perceived, if, at times, only dimly and without the "amity"
that New Hampshire had postulated.
255. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 89-90.
256. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 329 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
257. 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 45, at 205.
258. 4 F. THORPE, supra note 6, at 2457 (1784 N.H. CONST. art. XXXVII).
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